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Abstract
Many problems, from optics to economics, can be solved mathematically by find-
ing the highest, the quickest, the shortest — the best of something. This has
been true from antiquity to the present. Why did we start looking for such
explanations, and how and why did we conclude that we could productively do
so? In this article we explore these questions and tell a story about the his-
tory of optimization. Scientific examples we use to illustrate our story include
problems from ancient optics, and more modern questions in optics and classical
mechanics, drawing on ideas from Newton’s and Leibniz’s calculus and from the
Euler-Lagrange calculus of variations. A surprising role is also played by philo-
sophical and theological ideas, including those of Leibniz, Maupertuis, Maclaurin,
and Adam Smith.
Keywords: optimization, history of mathematics, calculus of variations, eco-
nomics, optics, principle of least action
Optimization is built into the fabric of all the sciences. Evolution requires
the maximization of reproductive success, by means of the best adapta-
tions. Physical equilibrium requires the minimization of potential energy.
The shape of soap bubbles minimizes the total surface area. And light in
space-time travels in the shortest path. Why do we construct scientific con-
cepts that work this way?
Now, if you ask a mathematician “why?” the answer you get will be a proof.
If you ask a scientist, or philosopher, or theologian, “why?” the explanation
you get will be a deduction from the basic principles of the person’s subject.
But if you ask a historian “why?”, the historian will tell you a story.
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So, here’s a question for me as a historian of mathematics: Why does so much
of modern science look for the shortest path, the least time, the greatest
volume, when we are trying to figure out how the universe works? Why
should laws describing the world maximize, or minimize, something? In
this paper, I will tell you the story of how this came to be in the western
scientific tradition.1 You will see the mathematician, scientist, philosopher,
and theologian answering the “why” question after their own fashions along
the way. And you will see that not only science, but also philosophy and,
even more surprisingly, theology, are actors in the history of mathematics.
1. From Antiquity to Fermat
My story begins in the first century of the Common Era, with Heron of
Alexandria. Heron was the first to use maximal and minimal principles
philosophically to explain a law of physics. What he explained was the equal-
angle law of reflection of light. [Heron, Catoptrics; see [1, pages 261–265]].
The law was known; Heron asked why it was true. First, he pointed out,
everybody thinks that sight travels in straight lines. (The Greeks thought
sight went from the eye to the object, not vice versa.) Heron said that all
fast-moving objects, not just sight, travel in straight lines — even projectiles
at the start of their motion. Why do they go straight? To get where they’re
going faster. As Heron put it, “By reason of its speed, the object tends to
move over the shortest path.” Hence, a straight line.
And light and sight are very fast. Heron said that we see the stars as soon as
we look up, even though the distance is infinite, so the rays go infinitely fast.
So there is no “interruption, nor curvature, nor changing direction; the rays
will move along the shortest path, a straight line.” That is true not only for
ordinary unimpeded light, but for reflected light as well. Light is reflected at
equal angles precisely because this gives the shortest path. Heron stated and
demonstrated that “of all possible incident rays from a given point reflected
to a given point, the shortest path is the one that is reflected at equal angles.”
1 My story tracks the path of science, and the philosophy it grew up with, from the
Greek-speaking world through medieval and modern Europe. It would be valuable to know
more about the role of optimization in the science, philosophy, mathematics, and religion
of other civilizations, especially those of China, India, and the Islamic world, but this is
beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Here is his diagram and proof:
Figure 1: The diagram for Heron’s proof [1, page 264].
Suppose the eye is at point C, the object at D. Let reflecting at A give equal
angles. Why is this the shortest path? Extend the line DA to the point C1
symmetric to where your eye is at C. The shortest path from D to C1 is the
straight line DAC1. Since DAC1 is a straight line, the vertical angles DAB
and MAC1 are equal. Thus the equal-angle path DAC equals the straight
line DAC1, and therefore the path DAC is the shortest path.
If there were reflection around another point B, where the angle of reflection
does not equal the angle of incidence, the non-straight-line path DBC1, and
thus the path symmetric to it, DBC, would be longer. Thus, says Heron,
“Reflection at equal angles is in conformity with reason,” which means, light
takes the shortest path. As we will see, this was an extremely influential
argument.
Let us turn now to another ancient mathematician, Pappus of Alexandria
(fourth century CE). Pappus was interested in what he called isoperimet-
ric problems in geometry. For instance, of all plane figures with the same
perimeter, which has the greatest area? Pappus introduced his discussion of
isoperimetric problems by enlisting an unusual mathematical colleague: the
honeybee. [Pappus, The Collection, Book 5; see [12, pages 185–186]].
Judith V. Grabiner 57
Pappus said, “God gave human beings the best and most perfect notion of
wisdom in general and of mathematical science in particular, but a partial
share in these things he allotted to some of the unreasoning animals as well.”
He noted that when bees set up their honeycombs, they divide them into
hexagons. He explained why they did so thus: “The bees have contrived
this by virtue of a certain geometrical forethought. . . .the figures must be
contiguous to one another. . . their sides common, so that no foreign matter
could enter the interstices between them and so defile the purity of their
produce.” And the figures have to be regular polygons, he said, “because
the bees would have none of figures which are not uniform.” Only three
regular polygons, he continued, the square, the triangle, and the hexagon,
are capable by themselves of exactly filling up the space about the same
point. Finally, he concluded, the bees know that the hexagon has larger area
than does the square or the triangle with the same perimeter, so they know
the hexagon “will hold more honey for the same expenditure of wax.” Thus
the bees have solved what we now call the problem of economically tiling the
plane with regular polygons.
Besides the ideas of Heron and Pappus, there is another influential max-
imal principle that we have inherited from Greek thought. However, this
one is not from mathematics or physics, but from philosophy. This prin-
ciple claims to answer the question, why are there so many different kinds
of things in the universe? Plato (427-347 BCE) gave this answer in his
Timaeus [pages 30, 33]: The universe is made so that it contains the maxi-
mal amount of being.2 The number of beings in the universe is the greatest
possible, wrote Plato, because of the goodness and lack of envy of the cre-
ator. That is, the creator exists, and is not envious, so he makes the universe
as much like himself as possible, full of things that exist [18, pages 46–55].
2 That the universe contains the maximal amount of being is called the Principle of
Plenitude, and [18, pages 380–381] lists dozens of important thinkers who spoke favorably
of this principle, including (besides Plato), Abelard, Aquinas, Thomas Browne, Victor
Hugo, Averroes, Galileo, Henry More, Glanvill, George Herbert, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke,
Addison, Bolingbroke, Petty, Monboddo, Schiller, Schleiermacher. The importance of the
principle in the philosophy and literature and theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries is amply documented in [18, pages 99–181]. The important role of the Principle
of Plenitude in the Scientific Revolution is discussed in depth in [14, pages 25, 42, 44, 52,
188, 275].
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However unusual Plato’s principle of maximal existence may seem to modern
thinkers, it was picked up by various theologians and philosophers and was
remarkably influential. For instance, in the seventeenth century, the prin-
ciple of maximal existence was used to argue that the universe is infinite,
and to argue that the stars have planets around them, even planets with
inhabitants.
One could quote hundreds of later statements influenced by Plato, Heron,
and Pappus about maximum or minimum principles and economy. I’ll set-
tle for four. Olympiodorus, in the sixth century, said, “Nature does nothing
superfluous or any unnecessary work.” Robert Grosseteste, in the thirteenth
century, said, “nature always acts in the mathematically shortest and best
possible way.” William of Ockham, in the fourteenth century, stated the doc-
trine known as Occam’s razor, which, simplified, has entered the language
as telling us that the simplest explanations are the best. In the Renais-
sance, Leonardo da Vinci said that nature is economical and her economy is
quantitative; for instance, living things eat each other so that the maximum
amount of life can exist from the minimum amount of material [13, page 580].
So the view that the universe must follow optimal principles has been very
pervasive. Nevertheless, this view cannot be said to have been empirically
based. So far, we are in the history of philosophy — or, when God is thought
to be involved, theology.
But eventually, these philosophical and theological ideas entered the exact
sciences. They found their culmination in the seventeenth century in the
treatment of the refraction of light by Pierre de Fermat. When Fermat
took up the subject, the law of refraction itself had already been discovered,
independently by Willebrod Snell and Rene Descartes. That law states that
when light goes from one medium into another, like from air into water, the
sine of the angle of incidence divided by the sine of the angle of refraction
is a constant for this pair of media. That is what we now call Snell’s law.
(Figure 2).
And now we are ready to look at Fermat and what he did. Calculus and
physics textbooks tell us that “Fermat’s principle” in optics says that when
light is refracted from one medium to another, it takes the path that min-
imizes the time. But that is not what Fermat said. Fermat was a mathe-
matician, not a physicist, and a truly great mathematician at that.
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Figure 2: Snell-Descartes Law of Refraction.
He, like Descartes, was an independent inventor of analytic geometry. Fermat
invented a method of finding maxima and minima, and methods of finding
tangents and areas. He did pathbreaking work in number theory and, with
Pascal, helped found probability theory. He also had a career in politics and
law. But he got involved in optics only late in his career.
Years before Fermat’s work on analytic geometry became known, Descartes
published his Geometry in 1637. And when Descartes heard about Fermat’s
similar work, he responded with disrespect. Descartes claimed that Fermat’s
tangent method was not general (it is in fact better than Descartes’ method,
which required first finding a circle tangent to the curve, while Fermat’s
method was not only general but purely algebraic), and Descartes said that
Fermat should read Descartes’ own Geometry to learn what was correct. Fer-
mat was annoyed by this, so when he became acquainted with Descartes’ work
on optics, Fermat was in no mood to be charitable. He strongly criticized
Descartes’ derivation of the law of refraction. [22, page 376]
Descartes imagined that light was a mechanical motion of the particles in
a medium he called the “ether.” When a ray of light crosses a bound-
ary to a place where the ether has different density, Descartes said, it was
like when a ball hits a tennis net. The component of velocity parallel to
the net is unchanged, but the component perpendicular to it is changed.
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One might think it would be slowed down in a denser medium. But no,
Descartes said. Coming into the denser medium, it gets a little kick from
the net. That is why its path is bent toward the perpendicular. [22, pages
378–380]
Fermat thought Descartes’ justification was nonsense, so he attacked the
problem himself, but in a quite different way. Fermat’s approach was mo-
tivated by a man who is hardly a household name: Marin Cureau de la
Chambre. In 1657, Cureau wrote about the law of reflection of light exactly
the way Heron had, by saying “nature always acts along the shortest paths.”
Fermat liked this approach, so he wrote to Cureau proposing to link his own
mathematics to Cureau’s physics; that would show Descartes! [22, page 382]
But the “shortest path” for refraction obviously cannot mean “the shortest
distance.” Instead, Fermat used an idea of Aristotle’s, that velocity in a
medium varies inversely as the medium’s resistance to motion. Fermat then
defined the path length as the product of the distance and the resistance.
Now we can understand in detail how Fermat, in 1662, derived the law of
refraction. See Figure 3.
For Fermat, the path from C to I to be minimized in refraction is not the sum
of the two lines CD and DI, but a sum involving multiples of those lines, the
multiples being determined by the ratio of the resistances. Let there exist a
line called M, such that the ratio of the resistances is M/DF.
Then Fermat used his method of maxima and minima to minimize the path
defined by the expression for the sum of each distance times the corresponding
resistance to motion: CD ˆ M + DI ˆ DF.
Minimizing the quantity that he calls the path in fact minimizes the time
travelled, since he follows Aristotle in assuming that resistance varies in-
versely with velocity, giving “path” the units of time, but Fermat did not say
here that he was minimizing the time. This is partly because Cureau thought
light travels infinitely fast and partly because Fermat did not want to take a
position on the physical question of whether light speeds up or slows down
in the denser medium; he chose to stay as mathematical as he could.
Fermat expected that, by applying his method of maxima and minima to
find the conditions for the shortest path, he would be able to derive the true
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Figure 3: Fermat path resistance derivation: Define M such that the ratio of resistances
is M{DF . “Path” is essentially distance times resistance. Minimizing the “path” gives
Snell’s law: ratio of resistances is DH{DF . Resistance varies inversely with velocity, and
we multiply distance by this to get time, so we have also minimized time.
law of refraction, whatever it was. Fermat must have been astounded when
he got the result that M = DH, which meant that the ratio of resistances
was DH/DF — which is equivalent to Snell’s Law, since the ratio DH/DF
is the ratio of the sines. [22, pages 387–390]. But now, Snell’s law is no
longer merely a description of how refraction takes place. Now Fermat could
say that he knew why that law is followed. It is because refracted light, like
reflected light, travels by the shortest path.
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Fermat’s explanation of why Snell’s law must necessarily be the law of refrac-
tion is supremely important, for two reasons. First, it helped establish Snell’s
law as an important physical law, rather than merely an individual empirical
relationship. And, more crucially, Fermat’s explanation shows that “shortest
path” arguments are not just philosophy. They give you real, non-trivial
physics.
We have now reached the end of the first part of our story. We have seen
that explaining physical laws by showing that they maximize or minimize
something comes from philosophy and theology, and long pre-dates the cal-
culus. And we have seen such an explanation entering seventeenth-century
optics in tandem with Fermat’s algebraic method of maxima and minima.3
The second part of our story will move even more deeply into mathematics.
2. Leibniz, Bernoulli, and Optimization
The invention of the calculus made it easier — and a lot more natural —
to seek and find maxima and minima. Leibniz, for both philosophical and
mathematical reasons, was especially interested in doing so. As a philosopher,
Leibniz had philosophical reasons for wanting to maximize and minimize
things, and, as an independent inventor of the calculus, he was able to do
so very well. In fact, Leibniz called his first publication of his differential
calculus a “new method of maxima and minima” ([17]; translated in [26,
pages 273–280]).
Leibniz’s first non-trivial application of his method of maxima and minima
was to derive the law of refraction using his new differential calculus. He
assumed that the light follows the shortest path, defined path as distance
times resistance, set the differential of the path function equal to zero, and
obtained Snell’s Law. Figure 4 presents his derivation. The derivation is
elegant, and Leibniz said that this shows how good his new calculus is.
But why, for Leibniz, should light follow the shortest path? Not just be-
cause Fermat said so. It is an example of something much more general that
lies at the heart of Leibniz’s philosophy: the principle of sufficient reason.
3 For details of Fermat?s method of maxima and minima, see the selections from Fermat
in [26, pages 222–227], and the detailed description in [12, pages 509–510].
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Figure 4: Leibniz derives Snell’s law from the “shortest path” assumption using calculus
(page 278 from [26]).
“Nothing happens without a reason why it is so and not otherwise,” Leibniz
said ([16], [32, page 92]). Leibniz gave many examples of early instances
of the use of the principle. For instance, Archimedes had used the princi-
ple of sufficient reason to prove that a balance with equal weights at equal
distances balances, because there is no reason it should incline to one side
rather than the other. The principle of sufficient reason leads naturally to
ideas of symmetry and economy. But Leibniz pushed it much farther. “For
every true proposition [about nature], . . . a reason can be given,” said Leib-
niz. He added that, “The first decree of God, [is] to do always what is most
perfect” ([15], [32, page 94]). And he related these views to Plato’s principle
of maximal existence.
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How many beings must this world contain? All possible kinds, said Leibniz.
Leibniz famously stated that this is the best of all possible worlds, and what
he meant by “best possible” was the world in which “the quantity of existence
is as great as possible.” So God, from all logically possible worlds, chooses
the best, the one with the greatest number of things in it [18, page 172].
According to Leibniz, that explains why the laws of nature are as simple as
possible. This allows God to find room for the most possible things. Leibniz
wrote, “If God had made use of other, less simple laws, it would be like
constructing a building of round stones, which leave more space unoccupied
than that which they fill.” [18, page 179]
Thus, Leibniz’s philosophy demands that natural laws will be the simplest,
with the maximum existence, the shortest paths. This principle may be
easy for us to challenge today, but Leibniz’s philosophical justification for
the simplest laws, the maximum existence, the shortest paths, made his
contemporaries much more interested in, and excited about, finding such
laws.
For example — a very influential example — Leibniz’s disciple Johann Ber-
noulli, in 1696, challenged the mathematical world with an interesting min-
imum problem. Let a body fall under gravitation. What is the curve along
which its descent will be quickest? One might first guess that it would be a
straight line, but, fifty years before Bernoulli, Galileo showed that it was not.
Galileo himself thought it was a circle, but it is not that either. Bernoulli
solved the problem by using Fermat’s and Leibniz’s “path with resistance”
idea, and by that approach, he found that the path of quickest descent is a
cycloid ([12, pages 586–588],[26, pages 391–399]).4
Bernoulli modeled the curve of quickest descent by imagining the body
“falling” through a medium made up of many infinitesimally thin layers (il-
lustrated by four layers in my sketch in Figure 5). Each layer has a different
density and thus each layer has a different resistance. The path of least-time
descent is modelled in the same way as the curved path of a light ray. The
path is bent as it passes from one layer to the next. In each layer, the ve-
4 Though it is not part of the present story, it is worth knowing that Newton solved
the problem also, on the night that he received it [31, page 582]. See also [12, page 586].
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Figure 5: Bernoulli “many levels” Snell’s law.
locity varies inversely as the resistance, so, as it enters each layer, it moves
according to Snell’s law, where the sine of each new angle depends on the
new velocity. Working this out for the interface between each infinitesimally
thin pair of layers, and using Leibniz’s calculus, Bernoulli got a differential
equation (where t is his notation for the velocity; see Figure 6):
dy “ t dx :
a
paa´ ttq





For the case of falling bodies, as Galileo had already shown without calculus
in the 1630s, the velocity squared of a falling body varies as the distance






which, Bernoulli recognized, defines the curve known as the cycloid. See
Figure 7.
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Figure 6: Bernoulli differential equation.
So the cycloid is the curve of quickest descent. Bernoulli thought this fact was
important for both philosophical and mathematical reasons. The method he
used here, he said, “solves at one stroke two important problems — an optical
one and a mechanical one.” These two vastly different problems “have the
same character” [26, page 394]. That is already economical. Furthermore,
Bernoulli added, the cycloid is also the curve in which, as Huygens found,
pendulums of fixed length and arbitrary amplitude oscillate in the same time.
So both the shortest-descent curve and the curve for same-time pendulum
motion is the cycloid. This cannot be an accident. In answering the question
of why the same curve can serve two separate purposes, Bernoulli explained,
and helped establish, the general principle: “Nature always tends to act in
the simplest way.” [26, page 395; my italics]
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Figure 7: Bernoulli cycloid: the details of Bernoulli’s solution from [26].
3. From Maupertuis to Hamilton
Now that we have described this background, the third and fourth parts
of this paper will address what happened to these ideas in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. The first line of development occurred in physics,
and stems from Pierre-Louis Maupertuis. The second is scientific but is also
philosophical and theological, and stems from Colin Maclaurin.
We begin with Maupertuis, who was an admirer of Newton and Newtonian
physics. It was Maupertuis who showed that Newton was right in predicting
the flattened-spheroid shape of the earth. Maupertuis travelled north to Lap-
land and actually measured the length of a degree of arc of the meridian there.
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But Maupertuis, though his physics was Newtonian, philosophically was a
Leibnizian. In 1744 he wrote a paper on the refraction of light. His goal was
philosophical: to use “those laws to which Nature herself seems to have been
subjected by a superior Intelligence, who, in the production of His effects,
makes Nature always proceed in the simplest manner” [27, page 176]. Like
Leibniz, Maupertuis believed that individual laws of nature exemplify general
rational principles, and he wanted to find what those rational principles are.
When Maupertuis tried to find the rational principle that explains the re-
flection and refraction of light, he appealed to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient
reason, saying that there is no reason for light to choose time, rather than
distance, to minimize. So there must be something more general than either
distance or time, and this more general thing will be minimized both in the
reflection of light and in the refraction of light, and also by unimpeded light
moving in a straight line. What is it that is minimized? Maupertuis invented
something that is: he called it “action.” He initially defined “action” as the
product of speed and distance. And he showed that minimizing this “action”
gives you all three laws of light. Here we have the first instance of something
being called the principle of least action. The mathematics was simple, and
the paper captured many people’s imaginations.
In 1746, Maupertuis added mass to his definition of “action” so it became
mvs. He was able to use this improved principle to describe the motion of two
bodies colliding on the plane, with the collision either elastic or inelastic. He
explained the laws of collision via least action by saying that, since nature
acts as simply as possible, “whenever there is any change in nature, the
quantity of action necessary for that change is the smallest possible” [27,
page 272]. For collisions, this is mathematically equivalent to what we now
call the conservation of momentum and energy.
Maupertuis saw the success of his approach as a mathematically-based proof
for the existence of God. He said that he had discovered a universal principle,
uniting all phenomena in the universe with “maximal efficiency,” and that
this demonstrates God’s infinite wisdom in planning it all [27, page 276].
Again, this may be too theological for us, but Maupertuis’s work influenced
d’Alembert, Euler, Lagrange, and Hamilton. These men refined the concept
of “action” and used it in their various formulations of what we now call
classical mechanics. Let us briefly look at what they did.
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D’Alembert realized that the principle of least action means that one no
longer needed to talk about force. Forces, said d’Alembert, are “obscure and
metaphysical entities.” Instead, he said, we should consider motion by means
of geometrical paths in space, without speculating about causes. He played
down the metaphysics of the principle of least action, instead calling it a
“geometrical truth.” Nonetheless, he said, it is an important truth, since it
works, not only for light and for collisions, but also for planetary orbits, as
Euler had shown [27, pages 290–292].
Euler, unlike d’Alembert, did accept Maupertuis’s metaphysics. Euler wrote,
“Since the fabric of the universe is most perfect and the work of a most wise
Creator, nothing at all takes place in the universe in which some rule of
maximum or minimum does not appear” ([13, page 573], [27, page 278]). And,
as a pioneer of the calculus of variations, Euler developed the mathematics
to back this statement up.5 His work on the calculus of variations grew out
of studying many problems, each of which had as its goal to find a curve that
maximizes or minimizes a particular integral [26, pages 399–406]. See Figure
8.
In the general theory Euler gave in his Methodus inveniendi (1744), the key
idea was to use a polygonal approximation to an integral to develop a nec-
essary condition for an extremal value, a condition eventually expressed as a











From this equation he gets many special cases, including those we have al-
ready discussed. For instance, minimizing the distance function gives y1 “ 0
and thus the path is a straight line (see Figure 9). Minimizing the time of
fall under gravitation yields Johann Bernoulli’s equations for the cycloid (see
Figure 10). And so on.
Euler saw that his derivation needed some more work. It was geometric, thus
relying on intuition instead of pure analysis [26, pages 399–400, 407]. Also,
it did not address finding a sufficient condition for the extremum. The 19-
year-old Joseph-Louis Lagrange, beginning in 1755, took the next steps [3].
5 For a thorough account of the history of the calculus of variations, see [4].
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Figure 8: Euler minimizes an integral.
To be sure, Lagrange began with Euler’s mathematics, but Lagrange also
paid homage to Maupertuis’s philosophy. Lagrange wrote to Maupertuis in
1756 that he, Lagrange, was working on a paper which would “demonstrate
with the greatest possible universality how your principle always supplies
with marvelous facility the solution to all cases most complicated and hard
to solve otherwise, in dynamics as well as hydrodynamics. . . I am fortu-
nate. . . to contribute. . . to the universal application of such a principle. . .
.the most beautiful and important discovery of mechanics” [27, page 355].
Lagrange used the principle of least action and the method of the calculus of
variations to get his equations of motion. Nor was this all. He also applied
a minimum principle in fluid dynamics, for both compressible and incom-
pressible fluids, and was able to derive Euler’s equations for fluid dynamics.
Thus, Lagrange concluded, a minimum principle governs this subject just as
it does the motion of particles and rigid bodies [13, page 739]. Three cheers
for the principle of least action!
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Figure 9: Euler integral necessary condition.
Or perhaps only two cheers. Although William Rowan Hamilton wanted
to continue the tradition of Lagrange’s deductive mathematical approach
to mechanics, Hamilton decided that the time had come to throw out the
metaphysics. Writing in 1833, Hamilton said, “Though the law of least action
has attained a rank among the highest theorems of physics, yet its pretensions
to a cosmological necessity, on the ground of economy in the universe, should
be generally rejected” [13, pages 740–741].
In other words, those philosophical and theological arguments got us here,
but now it’s time to kick away the ladder. Of course, we still use these prin-
ciples. Philosophers appreciate such broad formulations — consider Ernst
Mach’s phrase “the economy of thought” — perhaps for philosophical, per-
haps for aesthetic reasons. But physicists since Hamilton no longer cite such
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Figure 10: Euler gets the cycloid.
principles as evidence of God’s wisdom or efficiency. Nevertheless — and
this is my key point — believing in God’s and Nature’s rationality and effi-
ciency is what led people to these formulations in the first place. Traces of
the metaphysics remain in popular scientific culture. Witness, for instance,
the title of Hildebrandt and Tromba’s recent book on optimal principles in
science, The Parsimonious Universe [9], or the title of Paul Nahin’s more
mathematical book on the same topic, When Least Is Best [24].
4. From Maclaurin to Classical Economics
The general point that we still use the philosophical arguments in modern
thought will become clearer as we look at the last of the stories I want to
tell: how the philosophical, theological, and mathematical ideas moved once
more, this time from science into the larger society. Here, we begin with
Colin Maclaurin.
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When Maclaurin, a minister’s son, was sixteen, he tried to build a calculus-
based mathematical model for ethics. In a Latin essay whose title translates
into “On the good-seeking forces of mind” [19], Maclaurin analyzed mathe-
matically the forces by which our minds are attracted to different morally
good things. Using language borrowed from Newton’s physics, Maclaurin
said that the “forces with which our minds are carried towards different good
things are, other things being equal, proportional to the quantity of good
in these good things.” Also, the attractive force of a good one hour in the
future exceeds the attractive force of the same good several hours in the fu-
ture. Maclaurin represented the total quantity of good as the area under a
curve whose x-coordinate was time and whose y-coordinate was the intensity
of the good at that time. Maclaurin said one could find the maximum and
minimum intensities of any good or evil using calculus, and that one could
integrate and find the total good over any finite or infinite time. One con-
clusion supported by his mathematical models was that good men need not
complain “about the miseries of this life” since “their whole future happiness”
(eternal life after death) will be greater. Thus the young Maclaurin had
proved mathematically, at least to his own satisfaction, that the Christian
doctrine of salvation maximizes the happiness of good men.
Of course, Maclaurin grew up. The mature Maclaurin was a mathemati-
cian of stature and a respected contemporary of Euler. Maximizing and
minimizing are important to Maclaurin’s mature work in mathematics and
mathematical physics. It was Maclaurin who gave the first complete the-
ory of maxima and minima in terms of whether derivatives of all orders are
positive, negative, or zero. He did this using the Maclaurin series to study
maxima, minima, and points of inflexion of curves ([7, pages 216–217], [21,
§261, §§858–859]). Maclaurin’s work on extrema was highly influential. He
also applied the techniques of finding maxima and minima in many physical
situations and then compared his results to the best data. He studied solids
of least resistance, and the best designs for the hulls of ships, waterwheels,
and windmills. He used these techniques also in his studies of the shape of
rotating bodies under gravitation and thus of the shape of the earth ([6], [7,
pages 217–218]).
And, remember Pappus and the bees from Section 1? Maclaurin added the
third dimension. He wrote a paper [20] telling how bees, in constructing the
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cells of their honeycombs, use the shape that, for a given amount of material,
maximizes the volume of honey that a cell can contain; see Figure 11.
Figure 11: Maclaurin’s bee cell diagram [23, page 387]: maximum volume when the angle
is 2 arctan
?
2, about 109˝ 282.
The pyramidal base of a cell of a honeycomb, whose side is hexagonal, is
bounded by three rhombuses. In this situation, when does one get the max-
imal volume for a given surface area? The maximal volume is obtained,
Maclaurin showed in an elegant geometric argument, when the angle of the
rhombus is 2 arctan
?
2, which is about 109 degrees 28 minutes ([20], [23,
pages 386–387]). A few years earlier, Maraldi and de Réamur had actually
measured the angles of honeycomb cells — this is not easy — and got 110
degrees. Good job of optimization, bees.
Why did Maraldi and de Réamur want to measure that angle? Whether on
the Continent or in Britain, the motivation was the same. Maraldi and de
Réamur both hoped to be able to show that the bees chose the most eco-
nomical angle. They themselves were unable to do this. Although Maclaurin
did it purely geometrically, it obviously could be done by calculus. Samuel
Koenig, who was a follower of Leibniz, did do it using calculus. The average
bee doesn’t know much calculus, of course, so Koenig turned to theology,
saying that divine guidance had been given to the bees [28, page 23].
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Maclaurin, too, included philosophical observations with his argument. He
began by saying that the fact that the bees’ design uses the least wax confirms
the honeycomb’s “Regularity and Beauty, connected of Necessity with its
Frugality” [23, page 386]. And he concluded, “By following what is Best in
One Respect, unforeseen Advantages are often obtained, and what is most
Beautifull and Regular, is also found to be most Useful and Excellent.” [23,
page 391]
Charles Darwin was impressed with this result, which, as with other adap-
tations in nature, he did not ascribe to divine guidance. In Chapter VI of
his Origin of Species, Darwin stated that not only traits, but also instincts.
can be acquired and modified through natural selection. This applies even,
wrote Darwin, to “so marvelous an instinct as that which leads the bee to
make cells, which have practically anticipated the discoveries of profound
mathematicians.”
Interest in this question has continued into recent times. Tom Hales has
proved what is called the Honeycomb Conjecture: Any tiling of the plane
into regions of equal area must have total perimeter at least that of the
regular hexagonal honeycomb tiling [8]. So Pappus was right; the bees did
know it. Still, for three dimensions, the mathematician Fejes Toth showed in
1964 that if one constructed honeycomb cells bounded by two rhombuses and
two hexagons instead, slightly less wax would be used than in Maclaurin’s
solution, so the bees’ choice differs from the optimal by .35% [29].
The influence of Maclaurin’s philosophical and theological ideas on maxima
and minima, though, goes far beyond science. Maclaurin’s early interest in
maximizing goodness helped promote some other well-known and influential
ideas. One of Maclaurin’s classmates at Glasgow was the moral philosopher
Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson used mathematical principles — and language
like Newton’s and Maclaurin’s — to describe and to demonstrate his sup-
posed laws of virtue. Consider Hutcheson’s essay of 1728, “The manner of
computing the morality of actions.” Hutcheson wrote, “the Virtue is in pro-
portion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend... and
in equal Numbers, the Virtue [varies] as the Quantity of the Happiness.” So,
he concluded, “That Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness
for the greatest Numbers.” Later on, a similar approach to the study of soci-
ety is found in the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,
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who saw the best action as the one that produces the greatest good for the
greatest number. People like Hutcheson, Bentham, and Mill thought that
they were importing the methods of natural science into the social realm.
The economist Adam Smith will provide my last example. The resemblance
between some of Smith’s ideas and Maclaurin’s and Hutcheson’s is no acci-
dent. Before going on to Oxford, Smith was Hutcheson’s student at Glasgow.
And Smith not only learned science, he actually wrote a long essay, full of
admiration for Newtonian science, about the history of astronomy.6
Smith’s great 1776 classic in economics, The Wealth of Nations [25], states,
in words resembling Hutcheson’s: “Upon equal. . . profits. . . every individual
naturally inclines to employ his capital in the manner in which it is likely
to afford the greatest support to domestic industry, and to give revenue and
employment to the greatest number of people of his own country.” (my italics)
This is no minor point for Adam Smith. The most famous passage from The
Wealth of Nations immediately follows the one I just quoted, a fact which
shows how central this point is for Smith’s economics. The individual, said
Smith, “generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor
knows how much he is promoting it. . . he intends his own gain, and he is
thus . . . led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
his intention” [25, Book IV, Chapter II]. That is, individuals try to maximize
their personal gain, and as a result, the outcome is the best of all possible
economic worlds. Whether readers agree or disagree with Adam Smith, I am
sure they will agree that the influence of these ideas is still with us today.7
6 Smith’s essay, entitled The Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries
Illustrated by the History of Astronomy, was not published until 1880. Note that the term
“philosophical” in Smith’s time often meant what we would today call “scientific”. Compare
Newton’s great Principia, whose full title in English is Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy.
7 Among examples of the influence of Smith’s analysis of economic efficiency, especially
the key idea of the division of labor, see any economics textbook. F. W. Taylor’s idea of
“scientific management,” which involved detailed decomposition of industrial labor tasks
in order to organize them into an optimal production method, is also related to the history
of the ideas we have been tracing. See (and note the main title of) [11].
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5. Conclusion
Let us return to our original questions. Why do explanations presupposing
maxima and minima work so well and in so many scientific fields? That is
a philosophical question. Saying “It’s because nature is governed by conser-
vation laws, or by partial differential equations” just changes the terms; it
doesn’t answer the question. So why is nature like that? Maybe that is how
God chose to design the world. Maybe the universe itself is parsimonious.
Maybe it is an artifact of the way we think. But it does work.
But the historical question, “How did we come to learn to expect, seek, and
therefore find such explanations?” has, I think, been answered. Philosophical
ideas about the economy of nature and about God as a rational economist,
ideas powerfully reinforced by examples from geometrical optics and the ge-
ometrical insights of honeybees, and vastly accelerated by the techniques of
the calculus — these ideas have led to Hamiltonian mechanics, to the idea
of the greatest good for the greatest number, to the invention of the calculus
of variations, and to the theories of free-market economics.
Science has high standards for proof. But for discovery, it looks as though
anything goes, from beekeeping to theology. Once you’ve made a discovery,
though, it’s mathematics that lets you rigorously work out the consequences,
and then test those consequences against nature.
Science did not have to develop in the way that it did. It did so as the result of
a number of contingent historical and cultural events. I believe that science’s
successful search for the best, and most, and most economical embodies and
validates the idea — an idea now so embedded in our teaching and practice
that we cannot imagine that it ever was otherwise — that mathematics in
general, and the calculus in particular, is the best way to model the world.8
However, whether the objects of our study are necessarily optimal has not
been demonstrated, even if assuming them to be so has yielded many suc-
cesses. That the economic marketplace always produces the best possi-
ble result is a generalization, not an observation, and is historically
based on theological and philosophical ideas.9 So, at the end, a caution:
8 For an interesting and influential discussion of this topic, see [33].
9 This generalization has been criticized from a theological point of view, with worship
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We were lucky that theology and philosophy led us to ask certain scientific
questions, and that mathematical analysis allows us answer them rigorously.
Because using optimization has been so successful, it is tempting to conclude
that proceeding this way was “all for the best.” But, as the computer scien-
tist Joseph Weizenbaum observed long ago, we need to remain aware of the
limitations of our tools as well as their power [30, page 277].
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